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It is often argued that tax competition may lead to a ‘race to the bottom’. This result may 
indeed hold in the case of factor mobility (such as capital). However, in this paper we 
emphasize the unique feature of labor migration, that may nullify the’race to the bottom’ 
hypothesis. Labor migration is governed not only by net-of-tax factor rewards, but rather 
importantly also by the benefits that the welfare state provides. The paper analyzes fiscal 
competition with and without migration in a two-country, political-economy, model with 
labor of different skills. The paper assigns an active fiscal role for both the host and the source 
countries. It models the host country stylistically as a core EU welfare state, with tax financed 
benefits and migration policies, and the migration source country as an accession country 
(following the EU enlargement to 27 states), with its own welfare (tax-benefit) policy. We let 
these two asymmetric countries (in terms of their productivity) engage in fiscal competition. 
Using numerical simulations we examine how the migration and tax policies are shaped, and 
how they are affected by whether the skilled or the unskilled are in power. As the driving 
force behind migration is a productivity gap, we also analyze the implications of the 
productivity gap for the design of migration and tax policies. 


















We thank Ori Katz for competently performing the simulations. 1 Introduction
The paper analyzes ￿scal competition with and without migration in a
two-country, political-economy, model with labor of di⁄erent skills. The
paper assigns an active ￿scal role for both the host and the source coun-
tries in shaping policies concerning the generosity of the welfare state.
It models the host country who receives the immigrants stylistically as a
core EU welfare state, with tax ￿nanced bene￿ts and immigration poli-
cies, and the source country as an accession EU country (following the
EU enlargement to 27 states), with its own welfare (tax-bene￿t) policy.
The two countries are except the Total factor productivity in the host
country is asumed to be higher that that of the source country, wich takes
into account the possibility of emigration 1. We let these two countries
engage in ￿scal competition. The host country sets also an immigration
policy, whereas the source country takes this policy into account when
shaping its ￿scal policy. Using numerical simulations we examine how
the emmigration and tax policies are shaped, and how they are a⁄ected
by whether the skilled or the unskilled are in power. As the driving force
behind migration is a productivity gap, we also analyze the implications
of the productivity gap for the design of immigration and tax policies.
Would the tax competition lead to a "race to the bottom"? In gen-
eral, tax competition may lead to such a race due to three mutually
reinforcing factors. First, in order to attract mobile factors or pervent
their ￿ ight, tax rates on them are reduced. Second, the ￿ ight of mobile
factors from the relatively high tax to the relatively low tax countries
shrinks the tax base in the relatively high tax country. Third, the ￿ ight
of the mobile factors from the relatively high tax country is persumed
to reduce the renumeration of the immobile factors, and, consequently,
their tax payments 2. However, in our model the mobile factor is labor
of various skills. These factors consider not only their economic returns
when making their migration deasision, but rather also the social ben-
e￿ts o⁄ered by the countries. This is the key element that nulli￿es the
"race to the bottom hypothesis" in our model.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reports some
background empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the analytical frame-
work. Simulation results are reported in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1Recall that a grace period between 2004 and 2014 exists where an EU-15 member
state can regulate the immigration ￿ ows from the accession countries.
2For a general-equilibrium application to Europe without Race-to-the-bottom
￿nding see Mendoza and Tesar (2005)
22 Some Evidence on the Fiscal Aspects of Migra-
tion
This section reviews some evidence on the ￿scal apects of migration and
on native born attitudes toward immigration.
In 1997 the U.S. National Research Council sponsored a study on the
overall ￿scal impact of immigration into the U.S.; see Edmonston and
Smith (1997). The study looks comprehensibly at all layers of govern-
ment (federal, state, and local), all programs (bene￿ts), and all types of
taxes. For each cohort, de￿ned by age of arrival to the U.S., the bene￿ts
(cash or in kind) received by migrants over their own lifetimes and the
lifetimes of their ￿rst-generation descendents were projected. These ben-
e￿ts include Medicare, Medicaid, Supplementary Security Income (SSI),
Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, Old
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), etc. Similarly, taxes
paid directly by migrants and the incidence on migrants of other taxes
(such as corporate taxes) were also projected for the lifetimes of the
migrants and their ￿rst-generation descendents. Accordingly, the net
￿scal burden was projected and discounted to the present. In this way,
the net ￿scal burden for each age cohort of migrants was calculated in
present value terms. Within each age cohort, these calculations were dis-
aggregated according to three educational levels: Less than high school
education, high school education, and more than high school education.
Indeed the ￿ndings suggest that migrants with less than high school
education are typically a net ￿scal burden that can reach as high as
approximately US-$100,000 in present value, when the migrants￿age on
arrival is between 20￿ 30 years. See also the related analysis of Auerbach
and Oreopoulos(1999).
Following the recent enlargement of the European Union to 27 coun-
tries, only three members of the EU-15 (the UK, Sweden and Ireland)
allowed free access for residents of the accession countries to their na-
tional labor markets, in the year of the ￿rst enlargement, 2004. The
other members of the EU-15 took advantage of the clause that allows
for restricted labor markets for a transitional period of up to seven years.
Focusing on the UK and the A8 countries3, Dustmann at al (2009) bring
evidence of no welfare migration. The average age of the A8 migrants
during the period 20044-2008 is 25.8 years, considerably lower than the
native U.K. average age (38.7 years). The A8 migrants are also better
3The A8 countries are the ￿rst eight accession countries (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Poland.)
4More accurately, the said period extends from the second quarter of 2004 through
the ￿rst quarter of 2009.
3educated than the native-born. For instance, the percentage of those
that left full-time education at the age of 21 years or later is 35.5 among
the A8 migrants, compared to only 17.1 among the U.K. natives. An-
other indication that the migration is not predominantly driven by wel-
fare motives is the higher employment rate of the A8 migrants (83.1%)
relative to the U.K. natives (78.9%). Furthermore, for the same pe-
riod, the contribution of the A8 migrants to government revenues far ex-
ceeded the government expenditures attributed to them. A recent study
by Barbone et al (2009), based on the 2006 European Union Survey
of Income and Living conditions, ￿nds that migrants from the acces-
sion countries constitute only 1-2 percent of the total population in the
pre-enlargement EU countries (excluding Germany and Luxemburg); by
comparison, about 6 percent of the population in the latter EU countries
were born outside the enlarged EU. The small share of migrants from the
accession countries is, of course, not surprising in view of the restrictions
imposed on migration from the accession countries to the EU-15 before
the enlargement and during the transition period after the enlargement.
The study shows also that there is, as expected, a positive correlation
between the net current taxes (that is, taxes paid less bene￿ts received)
of migrants from all source countries and their education level5.
Hanmeueller and Hiscox (2010), using survey data in the US, ￿nd
two critical economic concerns that apear to generate anti-immigrant
sentiments among voters: concerns about labor-market competition,
and concerns about the ￿scal burden on public services. Not unex-
pectedly, employing opinion surveys, Hanson et al (2007) bring evidence
that in the United States native residents of states which provide gen-
erous bene￿ts to migrants also prefer to reduce the number of migrants.
Furthermore, the opposition is stronger among higher income groups.
Similarly, Hanson et al (2009), again employing opinion surveys, ￿nd for
the United States that native-born residents of states with a high share
of unskilled migrants, among the migrants population, prefer to restrict
in migration; whereas native-born residents of states with a high share
of skilled migrants among the migrant population are less likely to fa-
vor restricting migration6. Indeed, developed economies do attempt to
sort out immigrants by skills (see, for instance, Bhagwati and Gordon
(2009)). Australia and Canada employ a point system based on se-
lected immigrants￿characteristics. The U.S. employs explicit preference
for professional, technical and kindred immigrants under the so-called
third-preference quota. Jasso and Rosenzweig (2009) ￿nd that both the
Australian and American selection mechanisms are e⁄ective in sorting
5See also Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002)
6See also Mayda (2006)
4out the skilled migrants, and produce essentially similar outcomes de-
spite of their di⁄erent legal characteristics.
3 The Analytical Framework
We now turn to the analysis of a political-economy theory of the way
migration policiies and the generosity of the welfarte state are jointly
determined by majority voting. This section presents a styllitic two-
country model of migration and intra country redistribution policies.
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3.1 The Host Country






u ; 0 < ￿ < 1 (1)
where, Y is the GDP, A denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter,
and Li denotes the input of labor of skill level i, where i = s;u for skilled
and unskilled, respectively.
The competitive wages of skilled and unskilled labor are, respectively
ws = ￿Y=Ls (2)
wu = (1 ￿ ￿)Y=Lu:
Aggregate labor supply, for skilled and unskilled workers, respec-
tively, is given by:
Ls = (S + ￿￿)ls (3)
Lu = (1 ￿ S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)lu:
There is a continuum of workers, where the number of native-born is
normalized to 1; S denotes the share of native born skilled in the total
native-born labor supply; ￿ denotes the share of skilled migrants in the
total number of migrants; ￿ denotes the total number of migrants; and
li is the labor supply of an individual with skill level i 2 fs;ug
Total population (native born and migrants) is as follows
N = 1 + ￿: (4)
7See Cohen and Razin (2008) and Cohen, Razin and Sadka (2009) who analyze
the interactions between redistribution policies and migration policies using a similar
analytical framework.
8The parsimonious model is developed with the cross-section data is mind. The
migration variable is the stock of migrants; not ￿ ows (as relevant for dynamic analy-
sis).
5We specify a simple welfare-state system which levies a proportional
labor income tax at the rate ￿, with the revenues redistributed equally
to all residents (native born and migrants alike) as a demogrant, b; per
capita. The demogrant captures not only a cash transfer but also outlays
on public services such as education, health, and other provisions, that
bene￿t all workers, regardless of their contribution to the ￿nances of the
system.
The government budget constraint is therefore
Nb = ￿Y: (5)
The utility function for skill-type i 2 fs;ug is







where ci denotes consumption of an individual with skill level i, and
" > 0.
The budget constraint of an individual with skill level i is
ci = b + (1 ￿ ￿)liwi: (7)
Individual utility-maximization yields the following the labor supply
equation
li = ((1 ￿ ￿)wi)
" : (8)
It is then straightforward to calculate the equilibrium wages for the













where ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ and ￿ ￿
1￿S+(1￿￿)￿
S+￿￿
In order to ensure that the skilled wage always exceeds the unskilled
wage, ws > wu, we assume that
￿(1 ￿ S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(S + ￿￿)
> 1: (10)
:We now use this model to to analyze the policy-controlled regime.
63.2 The Source Country Economy
To simplify, we assume that the economies of the source country and
the host country are identical, except for a higher productivity factor
in the host country (e.g., all the other technology and preference para-
meters are identical). Also, each resident of the source country has an
individual-speci￿c cost of migration. This cost (denoted by c￿ and mea-
sured in utility terms) varies across individuals as in section 2.3.1 due
to individual characteristics such as age, family size, forms of portable
pensions, etc. For each skill group (their total size normalized to one) c￿
is distributed uniformly over the interval [0;c￿]. Throughout an asterisk
(￿) denotes the source country variables.
The description of the source country economy is similar to that of
the host country economy, as described in chapter 4. Production is as






u ;0 < ￿ < 1; (11)
where A￿ < A but ￿￿ = ￿. The competitive wage rates are given by
equation (2.2) with asterisks attached to the variables. The aggregate
labor supplies in the source country are di⁄erent than in the host because









u = (1 ￿ S
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)l
￿
u
We assume the same pre-migration skill composition in the two coun-
tries, that is, S￿ = S
Total population in the source country is
N
￿ = 1 ￿ ￿: (13)
The utility function of source function residents is given by equation
(4.2), with asterisks attached to the variables.
































1 ￿ S￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
S￿ ￿ ￿￿
:
7Note that ￿￿ = ￿. Similarly to the condition in equation (2.10), We
also assume that
￿￿(1 ￿ S￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)





The indirect utility function is given by (4.4) with asterisks attached
to the variables. The government budget constraint is given by
b
￿ =





Each resident in the source country, skilled or unskilled, decides whether
to migrate to the host country or stay in her source country, depending
on where her utility is higher (taking into account migration costs).
Consider ￿rst a skilled resident with migration cost of c￿. If she stays in
her source country, her utility level is Vs(￿￿;￿;￿). If she migrates to the
host country she enjoys a utility level of Vs(￿;￿;￿)￿c￿. Thus, there will
be a cuto⁄ level of the cost, denoted by b cs
￿;such that all skilled persons
with c￿ below b c￿
s will migrate and all others stay behind. The cuto⁄level
of the cost is given by:
Vs(￿
￿;￿;￿) = Vs(￿;￿;￿) ￿ b c
￿
s: (17)






Similarly, for the unskilled too there will be a cuto⁄ level of the
migration cost, denoted by b c￿
u which is given by
Vu(￿
￿;￿;￿) = Vu(￿;￿;￿) ￿ b c
￿
u: (19)
The number or unskilled migrants (mu) is then given by





Hence, the total number of migrants, (￿) is given by
￿ = ms + mu = (S
￿b c
￿





8and the share of the skilled migrants in the total migration is given
by
￿ = ms=(ms + mu): (22)
With the model described by (9.1)-(9.11) we are ready to formulate
various interactions between the source and the host-country.
3.4 Migration and Fiscal Competition
Each one of the two countries independently determines its tax-bene￿t
policy ((￿;b) and (￿￿;b￿)) by majority voting. That is, the policy is de-
termined by maximization of the (indirect) utility function of the skilled
or the unskilled, depending on which of the two groups forms a major-
ity. In doing so, voters in each country take the tax-bene￿t policy of the
other country as given (Nash-equilibrium). Also, voters take into ac-
count that migration takes place according to the mechanism described
in the preceding sub-section.
3.5 Fiscal Competition Model
To simplify the exposition we assume that the two countries are identical
in the technology and preferences parameters, except from the produc-
tivity factors, A and A￿. We assume that A > A￿. This productivity
advantage is the driver of migration ￿ ows from the source country to the
host country in our stylized model.
The indirect utility functions of the skilled and the unskilled in the





















































































The migration (incentive compatible) equations are9:
Vs(￿
￿;A
￿) = Vs(￿;A) ￿ ^ c
￿
s (29)






￿) = Vu(￿;A) ￿ ^ c
￿
u (31)




Finally, the de￿nitions of ￿ and ￿ are:





We now turn to the analysis of the ￿scal-competition problem.
3.6 Nash Equilibrium of Policy Game
To ￿x ideas we consider the case where the skilled are in the majority
in both the source and the host countries.
The ￿scal-competition Nash-game is as follows:




9We assume that the distribution of the reservation utilities is uniform, de￿ned
on the range [0,￿ c￿], for eah skill level. ^ c￿
i is the cuto⁄ reservation utility for skill level
i, i = s,u
10Subject to equations (9.13),(9.15),(9.19)-(9.24)
(II) The Source Country
MaxfVs;￿￿;b￿g(Vs)
Subject to equations (9.14) and (9.18)
Note that while the host-country regulate immigration, the source-
country does not attempt to regulate the emigration out￿ ows. The ￿scal
competition nash-equilibrium is the solution to (I) and (II).
We now compare the equilibrium policies (determining the generosity
of the welfare state) with the policies that will ensue in the absence of
migration; that is, when ￿ is set at zero. We carry this comparison via
numerical simulation.
4 The E⁄ect of Migration on Tax Policies: Simula-
tions
Consider ￿rst the case where the skilled are the majority (in both coun-
tries). As the productivity gap rises, the skilled majority in the host
country opts to raise the volume of migration, and to decrease the share
of skilled migrants. This is because the rise in the productivity gap
strengthens the positive e⁄ect on the marginal productivity of all com-
plementary inputs (unskilled labor) and generates also strong negative
e⁄ects on the marginal productivity of all competing inputs (skilled la-
bor). Things are di⁄erent in the case where the unskilled are the ma-
jority (in both countries). As the productivity gap rises, the unskilled
majority in the host country opts for a larger share of skilled among the
migrants, and also a larger volume of migration.
Figures 1 and 2 describe the e⁄ect of a rise in the productivity gap
and of migration on the tax rates and per-capita bene￿ts, respectively,
in the two countries for the case in which the skilled are in the majority
(in both countries). Note that the host-country has a lower tax rate with
a larger per-capita bene￿t, compared to the source-country, thanks to
its productivity advantage. In other words, the productivity advantage
implies that the host country can provide more generous bene￿ts than
the source country with a smaller tax rate.
Consider now the e⁄ect of an increase in the host-source productivity,
holding the source-country productivity ￿xed, thereby raising the pro-
ductivity gap. Tax rates in both the host and the source country fall.
11From Figure 2 we can see that the host-country bene￿ts rise whereas the
source-country bene￿ts fall.
Comparing the migration with the no migration case, Figure 1 shows
that migration raises the host-country tax rate, whereas it lowers the
source-country tax rate. This is an unexpected result in view of the
literature (see e.g. Chari and Kehoe (1990)). As far as the generosity of
the welfare state is concerned, comparing again the migration and the no
migration cases, Figure 2 shows that migration raises the host-country
bene￿ts but lowers the source-country bene￿ts, as expected in view of
the behavior of the tax rates.
Figures 3 and 4 describe the e⁄ect of the productivity gap and of
migration on the tax rates and per-capita bene￿ts, respectively, in the
two countries for the case in which the unskilled are in the majority (in
both countries).
Note that as in the case where the skilled are in the majority, the host-
country has a lower tax rate and higher per-capita bene￿t, compared to
the source-country, thanks to e⁄ect of productivity on political-economy
based tax rate.
Consider now the e⁄ect of an increase in the productivity gap de-
scribed in Figures 3 and 4. As the host-country productivity advantage
rises, the tax rate in the host country falls as in the case where the
skilled where the majority. But now the tax rate in the source-country
rises rather then falls. From Figure 4 we can see that as the host-country
productivity advantage rises, the host-country bene￿ts fall. As the tax
rate in the source country rises, so do the bene￿ts.
Comparing the migration with the no-migration cases, Figure 3 shows
that migration lowers the host-country tax rate, as is indeed expected in
view of the literature on factors mobility. However, in contrast to this
literature, the tax rate in the source country is higher under migration
than without migration. As far as the generosity of the welfare state is
concerned, Figure 4 shows that the bene￿ts behave in circumstance to
the tax rates. As expected, the host country tax rate falls if migration
is allowed because the native-born are reluctant to set high taxes, as
the proceeds of these taxes serve to ￿nance also bene￿ts to immigrants
("￿scal leakage"), as in Razin ans Sadka (2002a) and (2002b).
5 Conclusion
It is often argued that tax competition may lead to a "race to the bot-
tom". This result may indeed hold in the case of factor mobility (such
as capital). However, in this paper we emphasize the unique feature of
12labor migration, that may nullify the"race to the bottom" hypothesis.
Labor migration is governed not only by net-of-tax factor rewards, but
rather importantly also by the bene￿ts that the welfare state provides.
Taking this consideration into account, countries are less reluctant to
impose taxes that ￿nance bene￿ts to their residents in the presence of
migration. Employing simulation methhods we can indeed demonstrate
that migration need not lower taxes in the source country, and may even
give rise to higher taxes.
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